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Contemplating an Evolutionary Approach to Entrepreneurship 
 
Abstract: 
This paper explores that application of evolutionary approaches to the study of 
entrepreneurship. It is argued an evolutionary theory of entrepreneurship must give as 
much concern to the foundations of evolutionary thought as it does the nature 
entrepreneurship. The central point being that we must move beyond a debate or 
preference of the natural selection and adaptationist viewpoints. Only then can the 
interrelationships between individuals, firms, populations and the environments within 
which they interact be better appreciated.     
 





During recent times, the frequency of calls for researchers of entrepreneurship to 
adopt an evolutionary approach has increased. Two of the domain’s leading journals (i.e. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice and the Journal of Business Venturing) have 
organised special editions devoted to consideration of the increasing application of 
evolutionary theories to the study of entrepreneurship. Appropriately, the work of Howard 
Aldrich strongly influences the content and contributors of these special editions. 
Aldrich’s (1999) articulation of a generic evolutionary framework to advance our 
understanding of social change is perhaps destined to become a landmark contribution 
within the developing field of entrepreneurship research. Yet, despite the breadth of its 
contribution, many questions remain unresolved, many raised by Aldrich himself in his 
concluding ‘invitation’ chapter. This paper accepts the challenge of Aldrich’s challenge to 
further explore the application of evolutionary theory to the emergence and disappearance 
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of organizational entities. In doing so, this paper deliberately adopts a very eclectic 
approach, attempting to synthesize ideas that seemingly remain isolated. The journey of 
confronting the problems that have prevented the development of a legitimate 
evolutionary approach to the study of entrepreneurship is one requiring much 
compromise.  
This paper is structured in the following manner. First, the importance of an 
evolutionary approach to entrepreneurship research is considered. Second, the 
prerequisites of an evolutionary approach are discussed. Third, problematic issues that 
remain contested are explored through consideration of areas of emerging consensus. 
Fourth, the nature of empirical evidence required to progress the development of an 
evolutionary approach to entrepreneurship research is discussed. In keeping with the 
Aldrichian spirit, the paper concludes by drawing out the implications that arise from this 
discussion and presents more questions that remain unanswered.   
 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Entrepreneurship research represents a domain of enquiry that is at present 
“anchored in the disciplines” of economics, sociology, organizational theory, and 
psychology (Davidsson, Low & Wright, 2001: 14). To many, entrepreneurship has yet to 
emerge as a respected discipline in its own right. This is disappointing given the 
importance of entrepreneurship research to addressing the issues economic and social 
change. In 1988, Murray Low and Ian MacMillan raised six specific concerns relating to 
past and future research into entrepreneurship. The six specific areas of critical importance 
to entrepreneurship researchers reviewed were: purpose, theoretical perspective, focus, 
level of analysis, time frame, and methodology. These specific issues have generally 
received isolated attention, with the obvious exception being the increased use of 
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evolutionary theories within entrepreneurship research. This approach has enabled an 
increased focus on not only context and process, but also causal explanations relating to 
the outcomes of entrepreneurial behaviour.  
In contrast to calls for a “predictive theory of the behavior of entrepreneurs” 
(Amit, Glosten & Muller, 1990: 1232), non-predictive evolutionary perspectives enable 
the specific issues raised by Low and MacMillan (1988) to be fully accommodated, 
thereby advancing the cause of entrepreneurship as a distinct research discipline. 
Examples include; Aldrich and Martinez’s (2001) direct response to Low and MacMillan; 
Aldrich’s (1999) use of an evolutionary perspective to consider organizational change; 
Brittain’s (1994) ecological explanation of community evolution; Baum and Singh’s 
(1994) consideration of the replicating and interacting hierarchical processes; Murmann 
and Tushman’s (2001) assertion that social context is an important determinate of 
entrepreneurial activity; and Lumsden and Singh’s (1990) discussion of organizational 
speciation. These examples demonstrate the widespread use of evolutionary theories to 
research various aspects of entrepreneurship.   
Throughout these exemplars attention is paid to purpose (a general focus on how 
entrepreneurship furthers economic progress); theoretical perspective (a trend from strong 
to weak selection, ensuring adaptive and environmental change factors are simultaneously 
considered); focus (greater emphasis placed upon understanding the context and process 
of entrepreneurship); level of analysis (consideration of hierarchical interacting 
relationships at which selection occurs, for example, the ecosystem, communities of 
practice, populations of firms, firms, routines, individuals); time frame (greater 
appreciation of cohort and period effects); and methodology (acceptance of multiple 
methods and a greater importance given to causality). An evolutionary approach 
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accommodates and places great emphasis on all six issues, however, the nature and design 
of evolutionary approaches remains quite varied.  
Differences of opinion remain within the literature as to what constitutes an 
evolutionary approach or theory. The original ideas of Lamarck and Darwin clearly have 
lost their shape through repeated reinterpretation and transfer from one domain to another. 
Rather than attempt a top-down unravelling of what exists, a more profitable approach 
may be to proceed from the bottom-up, determining the prerequisites of an appropriate 
evolutionary approach to the study of entrepreneurship.   
 
PREREQUISITES OF AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
To address this issue, two perspectives are considered, one economic and the other, 
philosophical. Economic theory represents the most enduring of theoretical bases upon 
which entrepreneurship research has been guided. While acknowledging the difficulties of 
classifying all manner of items, a taxonomy of economic evolution is provided by 
Hodgson (1993). Two broad perspectives of evolution are considered, those being 
developmental and genetic evolution. The developmental perspective adopts the view that 
evolution would progress through a series of stages, as if the outcome was predicable. An 
example being the Marxian idea that a socio-economic system evolves from a primitive 
form of communism, to classical antiquity, to feudalism and capitalism, to socialism and 
communism. Hodgson uses the term genetic in a non-biological way to mean an emphasis 
upon determining causality with regards the interacting components of a system. Within 
the genetic perspective, ontogenetic and phylogenetic categories exist.  
Ontogenetic evolution (e.g. Schumpeter) has a weak focus on selection 
mechanisms and is characterised by a belief that a fixed genetic instruction set (moderated 
by environmental conditions) is representative of a (single) entities set of evolutionary 
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possibilities. In contrast, phylogenetic evolution places great emphasis on selection to 
establish causality. The works of Thorstein Veblen provide the earliest example of 
phylogenetic evolution being proposed in the economic sphere. Hodgson (1993) notes the 
argument against the ontogenetic position of consummation in economic evolution by 
Veblen (1919) in favour an evolutionary explanation related to selection within 
populations and focused on causality.  
So, from an economic perspective, evolution can take the form of a developmental 
theory that presumes the advancement from one state to another. It also can be considered 
from a genetic perspective, with two different approaches. Firstly, it can be considered 
ontogenetic, where the outcomes of change for a particular entity are seemingly 
predetermined with only environmental influence altering the eventual equilibrium 
position. Alternatively, the process of phylogenetic evolution allows for the “complete and 
ongoing evolution of a population” (Hodgson, 1993: 40) with acceptance that the 
generative mechanisms that determine structural change may also be altered through a 
blind (and differential) process of selection. This second evolutionary perspective is one 
developed by philosophers of science. At the heart of their work is the central issue of 
what constitutes an evolutionary theory. 
 
MINIMAL EVOLUTIONARY REQUIREMENTS 
The recent philosophical musings of several prominent academics has advanced 
the basic minimal requirements of evolutionary theory and also raises the issue of 
Lamarckism as a potential strange bedfellow for Darwinism within the socioeconomic 
sphere. This section will consider the minimal requirements for a sound evolutionary 
theory. With reference to Darwin’s principle of natural selection, Lewontin articulated 
three evolutionary principles. The first principle being phenotypic variation where 
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different entities in a population have “different morphologies, physiologies, and 
behaviours” (Lewontin, 1970: 1). The second principle being differential fitness, or, the 
differential survival and reproduction of phenotypes in different environments. The third 
principle being heritable fitness, or, the “correlation between parents and offspring in the 
contribution of each future generations”. Lewontin proposed that any population 
displaying these principles would undergo transformation.  
Closely related was Campbell’s (1965) blind-variation-selective-retention process, 
which aimed to explain the general evolutionary process occurring within and between 
entities. This was to become the foundation of Campbell’s ‘evolutionary epistemology’, a 
phrase he coined in 1974 (Plotkin, 1993). Importantly, Campbell successfully championed 
the long held view1 that a general theory of evolution was indeed applicable beyond the 
boundaries of biology (Hodgson, 2003a). Eventually, the perceived ubiquity of blind-
variation-selective-retention process led Dawkins (1983) to coin the phrase ‘Universal 
Darwinism’. Hodgson (2003b: 90) states that “the difference between natural and social 
evolution was in the units of selection and in the details of the evolution process, not in the 
exclusion of variation, inheritance [i.e. retention], or selection from the social sphere”. An 
alternative, but complementary view (Plotkin, 1993) to that of the blind-variation-
selective-retention process also exists. That is David Hull’s proposition that an 
evolutionary theory must incorporate two specific entities, a replicator and a interactor. 
These terms are defined by Hull (1988: 408) as any “entity that passes on its structure 
largely intact in successive replications” and any “entity that interacts as a cohesive whole 
with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be 
differential”, and are widely accepted. 
However, while Darwinism provides a rigorous theory and has at its heart a focus 
upon the problem of causality, the challenge remains to identify a process of transmission 
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from within which “selected variants are moved about in space and conserved in over 
time” (Plotkin, 1993: 84). Indeed, Durham suggests that this challenge is but one of five 
essential requirements of any evolutionary system, illustrated in Figure 1 below.  
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Determining the units of transmission within the socio-economic domain has long 
represented a complex debate. There would now appear to be convincing arguments2 
within the current literature that habits and routines are suitable representative units of 
transmission. Sources of variation are typically accounted for by means of innovation, 
imitation, and new entrants. To establish a process of cumulative causation, it is vital that 
a mechanism of transmission is identified and explained. This however remains a 
challenging task for evolutionary theorists. Knudsen (2002: 451) implores researchers “to 
account for the mechanism of transmission and the infusion of new but not limited 
variation around the mean of what turned out to provide an advantage”. Similarly, 
Murmann (2003: 11) suggests the challenge that remains for any evolutionary explanation 
“is to specify how variants are introduced, how selection leaves behind variants that were 
not as fit according to the prevailing selection criteria (criteria that in turn need to be 
identified), and how some variants are retained over time to create a historical trajectory or 
genealogy captured by decent with modification”.   
What becomes evident is that in order to meet the minimal requirements of an 
evolutionary theory in the socio-economic domain, only certain forms of phylogenetic 
economic evolution satisfy the requirements of Lewontin, Campbell, Hull, and Durham. 
Across these perspectives is the need for variation to be blind (in the sense that we cannot 
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predict the future), random, or purposive in character, selection must be differential, and a 
mechanism must exist through which favoured characteristics are retained in a population 
and passed on to other generations. The alternative developmental perspective is tolerant 
of and expecting the presence of an eventual equilibrium. Likewise, Hodgson (1993) also 
notes that Schumpeter uses the term evolutionary in the ‘developmental’ sense while also 
rejecting any analogy with natural selection. Lastly, Hodgson also notes the tendency of 
Hayek’s (1988) spontaneous order to gravitate towards to equilibrium. Also, Hayek’s 
support of methodological individualism is problematic, suggesting an eventual focus 
upon one sole level of selection. Essentially, Hayek’s evolutionary theories are 
consummatory with creativity and ongoing variety restoring order, rather than continually 
providing the seeds discontent. The varied and related minimal requirements of an 
evolutionary approach can be illustrated in Figure 2 below. Importantly, the degree of 
consistency that is present in the seminal works of Campbell, Lewontin, Durham, and Hull 
are all derived from a Darwinian perspective.  
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Since the verbose writings of Veblen, the presence of Darwinian selection is 
accepted amongst old institutional economists (e.g. Hamilton, 1953 and Hodgson, 2003b) 
and increasingly in other areas other social sciences. In contrast to orthodox economics, 
this school of thought is comfortable to develop an evolutionary perspective without the 
need of equilibrium assumptions. The recent works of Geoffrey Hodgson in renewing 
Veblen’s post-Darwinian thoughts are important with regards advancing an evolutionary 
theory through which entrepreneurial behaviour is explainable.  To address this point, it is 
 9
first necessary to briefly consider the nature and relationships between Darwinian and 
Lamarckian ideas and how they relate to the neo-Darwinian position. This is perhaps best 
achieved by noting briefly how these theories have been applied in organizational, 
economic and entrepreneurship literature. Hodgson (2003a: 95) defines Darwinism as “a 
causal theory of evolution in complex or organic systems, involving the inheritance of 
genotypic instructions by individual units, a variation of genotypes, and a process of 
selection of the consequent phenotypes according to their fitness in their environment”. 
Hodgson continues on to define Lamarckism as ‘a doctrine admitting the possibility of the 
(genotypic) inheritance of acquired (phenotypic) characters by individual organisms in 
evolutionary processes’. 
 
PROBLEMATIC ISSUES AND AREAS OF EMERGING CONSENSUS 
The processes of Darwinian selection and Lamarckian adaptation tend to anchor 
opposing sides of a debate that has prevailed for decades within the economic and 
organizational theory literatures (Lewin & Volberda, 1999). This debate centres upon the 
respective influence of the environment to select under performing firms from an industry, 
versus the ability of firms to arrest the process of natural selection through adaptation to 
the their changing environment. Lamarck (1984: 70) felt that the “progress in complexity 
of an organisation exhibits anomalies here and there … due to the influence of 
environment and of acquired habits”. Generally, socioeconomic evolution has been 
considered Lamarckian in nature (e.g. Nelson & Winter 1982) due to the fact that it is 
purposive (Rescher, 1977). That said, sound arguments that socioeconomic evolution is 
first and foremost Darwinian exist (Dollimore, 2003), and these will be considered in 
more detail throughout this paper. 
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It is however perhaps due to the outright rejection of Lamarckian evolution by 
biologists in favour of Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection (i.e. modification by 
decent), the two views have assumed a degree of rivalry. This is disappointing given the 
desire of Campbell (1965) to advance a general evolutionary theory of the processes 
occurring within and between entities. As a result, those who support the population 
ecology views (e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 1977) often to fail to consider the likelihood of 
firm level adaptation. Alternatively, advocates of contingency theory (e.g. Donaldson, 
1988) and strategic choice perspectives (Miles & Snow, 1994) continue to assert that 
variation arises from environmental change and that firm’s are capable of securing a fit 
with their operating environment. The middle ground of this debate belongs to those 
pragmatic researchers who seek to understand the interrelated process of selection and 
adaptation (e.g. Levinthal, 1991; Haveman, 1992; Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; 
Bruderer & Singh, 1996; Rao, 1998). Such approaches tend to acknowledge both 
Darwinian and Lamarckian processes. Charles Darwin was at least tolerant of Lamarckian 
evolution (Hodgson, 2001) on the proviso that “acquired characters are inherited only 
rarely and weakly” (Gould, 2002: 354). On this basis, Darwin noted, “that natural 
selection has been the most important, but not the exclusive, means of modification” 
(1901: 4). Others suggest that Darwin eventually became very reliant upon Lamarck’s 
acquired characteristics3 to overcome a potentially fatal challenge to his mechanism of 
heredity (Koestler, 1978). Therefore, an evolutionary theory must also address the 
occurrence of variations associated with adaptive behaviours within evolving systems.  
 Importantly, Veblen’s Darwinism also incorporated aspects of Lamarckism, 
specifically, the inheritance of acquired characters (Hodgson, 1993). However, following 
Veblen’s death in 1929, the unpopularity of social Darwinism4 and the increasing 
acceptance of the term neo-Darwinism in society, the further development of Veblen’s 
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post-Darwin economics where thwarted. The term neo-Darwinian has existed since 
Darwin’s protégé George Romanes used it to describe those who explicitly rejected the 
possibility of the inheritance of acquired characteristics as being “more Darwinian than 
Darwin” (Wilkins, 2001: 161-162). Within the domain of socio-economic evolution, 
Weismannism is the term used to describe the neo-Darwinist position. Essentially, the 
mechanisms through which organizational structures are created remain unaltered through 
interaction with the operating environment. This view is more in line with the process of 
natural selection operating upon firms within a given population. Therefore, when 
adopting a Darwinist perspective, the previously dominant position that Weismannism and 
Lamarckism are mutually exclusive is less valid. This is because there is little difference 
between the causal structures of both forms of evolution (Knudsen, 2002: 451) with “the 
only thing that sets Lamarckian selection apart from neo-Darwinian selection is that 
replicators are modified due to information received from their carriers, the interactors”.  
 The recent work of Knudsen (2001) and Hodgson (2001) suggests that we can 
work towards a more intuitive, and more Darwinian explanation of the processes of 
firm/population transformation that embodies both Weismannian and Lamarckian 
processes. From this perspective, Lamarckian evolution nests within a Darwinian 
framework that also accommodates the process of natural selection. Such an approach is 
consistent with Williams (1996: v) who states that “when recognised, adaptation should be 
attributed to no higher a level of organization than is demanded by the evidence. Natural 
selection is the only acceptable explanation for the genesis and maintenance of 
adaptation”. The focus is not purely upon environmental elements (i.e. political, 
economic, socio-cultural, technological, and international forces) to determine fitness, but 
rather the interplay between the environment and the firm’s activities that play the role of 
interactors. However, clearly issues remain unresolved that prevent the advancement of an 
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evolutionary theory through which entrepreneurial processes and outcomes can be better 
understood. “The next step in entrepreneurial research is very clear: we need to stop a 
posteriori explaining the interaction between strategy and environment and between 
process, context, and outcomes” (Aldrich & Martinez, 2001: 53). 
 
THE NEED FOR EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The task at hand would appear the need to generate theory that can be later verified 
and tested for accuracy. So many questions remain unanswered and without consensus. 
This section will consider four important issues that currently provide roadblocks to the 
development of a sound evolutionary theory. The first is the contentious issue of whether 
Lamarckian evolution should be assumed to better explain socioeconomic evolution than 
Darwinism. The second issue relates to the nature of selection at its multiple forms within 
and outside social entities. The third issue is concerned with what elements of an entity 
interact to with the environment in such a way that favourable (or non-favourable) 
selection occurs. The last issue to be discussed is that of the nature of replication. It is 
argued that at present, our general understanding of how all four processes exist (and are 
interrelated) as applied to entrepreneurship research is insufficient to support the 
development of a sound evolutionary theory of entrepreneurship. The remainder of this 
section attempts to highlight areas of confusion that are increasingly less serviced by 
conceptual theorizing. It is from empirical   research that the way forward must be 
achieved. Lets us briefly consider the four issues raised thus far and then the possible 
relationships between them. 
At the heart of Lamarckism are two specific laws that Jean-Baptiste Lamarck 
outlined in his most famous work, the Philosophie Zoologique published in 1809. The first 
law, called the ‘law of use and disuse’ suggests that new organs, or modified old ones, 
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occur spontaneously through need satisfied by use and disappear through disuse. The 
second law, called the ‘law of inheritance of acquired characteristics’ maintains that any 
such change is heritable. Consequently, Lamarckism provides the means through which 
continuous and gradual change can occur within organisms through which a better degree 
of fitness is achieved vis-à-vis their environments. The underlying assumption is that 
Lamarckism is a function of the organism’s physiological needs that are continually 
altered through interaction with the environment.  
In the past it has not been uncommon for work to be presented as Lamarckian in 
nature (e.g. Nelson & Winter, 1982). As a result, it would seem that the term Lamarckism 
is all to easily applied within work where social learning and intentionality are taken as 
given. That is, where it is accepted that humans and the organizational forms they create 
and operate are capable of searching for and selecting in favor of new forms of variation 
that are perceived at some point in time to advance their situation. As a result, social 
change achieved through the generic evolutionary processes of variation, selection and 
retention is increasingly described as Lamarckism5. However, the emphasis is clearly 
more related to Lamarck’s first law than the second law. To demonstrate empirically the 
role and frequency of Lamarckism with the domain of socioeconomic evolution, the 
inheritance of acquired characters from one generation to another must be shown to occur.   
The challenge that remains, regardless of whether one accepts that the process of 
Lamarckism nests within an overarching Darwinian framework (Knudsen, 2002), is to 
separate the occasions when acquired characters6 are retained within the life of a social 
entity and when they are passed on to another generation of that entity. It is argued that the 
failure to do so will add a burden to those researchers who wish to develop a truly sound 
evolutionary account for socioeconomic change. Both laws must be accounted for, not 
merely the presence of acquired characters. Lets explore further the issue by way of 
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example to illustrate the present dilemma that accompanies current assumptions that 
socioeconomic evolution is inherently Lamarckian. 
Consider the Hobart pizza industry that has emerged over the past 35 years. Of the 
100 plus firms that have contested this industry, some pioneering foundings have survived 
to this day. Many have failed, and many have entered the industry with prior experience 
and/or knowledge gained from past employment. Early on during the formation of the 
industry, relational ties between the predominately Italian pioneers were strong. 
Knowledge related to improvements and the nature of how best to operate a pizzeria was 
shared frequently at weekly social occasions. As the industry developed, relational ties 
weakened as the population density increased and competition increased. For those new 
entrants that were not part of the initial network of pioneers, learning how best operate 
their pizzeria was achieved through either employment within the industry or through 
(partial) imitation of businesses practices that by and large were quite transparent. Over 
time, the survival of many, but not all entrants can be explained by Lamarckian evolution.  
 It can be clearly observed that many past employees of the pioneers who worked in 
operations that continually acquired characters that (apparently) increased fitness in the 
emerging industry were able to spin-off successful pizzerias themselves. Further, many of 
the spin-off’s employees were able to start up pizzerias within which the practices of the 
initial pioneers were present. Clearly, both of Lamarck’s laws are present with evidence of 
the firms acquiring specific characters that they deemed useful and those characters being 
directly inherited by future generations of pizzeria owners. For those pizzerias that were 
not responsible for any spin-offs, the application of Lamarckism to explain their 
development is problematic due to the lack of evidence regarding the heritability of their 
acquired characters. It is argued that at present a failing of Lamarckian explanations of 
socioeconomic evolution is the suggestion that imitation from afar is sufficient to account 
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for the inheritance of acquired characters from one firm to another. The alternative 
explanation offered is that, in the absence of more specific evidence regarding the 
transmission of acquired characters, Darwinian specific processes are best used to account 
for the adaptation of social entities whose operations are relatively isolated from other 
industry participants.  
 Such an alternative explanation can be outline with reference to Baldwinian 
evolution. Deacon (1997: 322) notes “Baldwin’s theory explains how behaviors can effect 
evolution, but without the necessity of claiming that responses to environmental demands 
acquired during one’s lifetime could be passed directly to one’s offspring”. Baldwin’s ‘A 
New Factor in Evolution’, published 1896, sought to refute Lamarckism through claiming 
that the context of natural selection could be modified (for future generations) due to the 
process of learning and behavioral flexibility. Baldwin’s Darwinian inspired concept was 
however to many “a notion lying on the borderline of Lamarckism” (Plotkin, 1993: 6). It 
however fits in with other Darwinian based explanations of adaptive survival, such as 
genetic assimilation (e.g. Waddington, 1969) and adaptive radiation7 (Baldwin, 1896). The 
point is, to ignore accepted Darwinian explanations of intentional adaptation to the 
environment in favor of Lamarckian explanations makes it all the more difficult to unite 
the adaptationist and selection viewpoints. Both sides can propose explanations of 
phenotypic plasticity through which adaptive behaviour results in reduced selection 
pressure. However, it would seem we have much ground to recover to again maintain 
Darwin’s (if begrudging) assimilation of Darwinian and Lamarckian processes to explain 
the ongoing evolution of entities. This past failure to dig deeper also prevents closer 
analysis of how selection forces impact evolution. 
Selection that produces evolution has been defined “as repeated cycles of 
replication, variation, and environmental interaction so structured that environmental 
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interaction causes replication to be differential” (Hull, Langman & Glenn, 2001: 53). 
Within organizational studies, selection is typically thought of as external or internal 
forces (to a firm) “that differentially select or selectively eliminate certain types of 
variations” (Aldrich, 1999: 26). It is quite often assumed such forces ensure conformity to 
instutionalized norms and adherence to past (internal) selection criteria. However, a risk of 
ignorance remains ever present when selection is considered to primarily perform a 
stabilizing role within populations, given that it frequently behaves in different ways. 
Grant (1985) and Amburgey, Dacin and Kelly (1994) suggest that external selection 
processes can be considered in three general patterns, stabilizing, directional, and 
disruptive. When attempting to reconcile the outcomes of various learning processes, it is 
critical that the nature and the type of selection occurring with the population is 
understood. To not do so would be to invite misinterpretation of any future data. 
For example, returning to the Hobart pizza industry, it can be observed that the 
most influential selection forces that shaped the evolution of the industry were directional 
and disruptive selection forces. The arrival of the first nationwide franchise chain 
increased the level of primary demand for pizza and changed the times when pizza was 
consumed. Those firms capable of following the lead of the very visible practices 
introduced by industry leaders seemed to benefit from the increasing demand for pizza 
(i.e. directional selection). Alternatively, the number of firms contesting the industry 
shifted radically downward with the arrival of the second nationwide franchise chain. 
Introducing harsh price-based competition, it was those firms that had neither a high 
quality (restaurant style) nor highly efficient (franchise style) operations that felt the full 
weight of the selection forces. In this instance, a disruptive selection process quickly 
removed those situated in between the quality and price-based offerings. The most 
noticeable example of stabilizing selection accompanied the disruptive selection of those 
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neither specifically quality nor operationally efficient operators whose management of 
cash flows nevertheless saw them favoured by the introduction of a (10%) goods and 
services tax. Those that mismanaged their cashflow, irrespective of their market 
positioning, struggled to adapt to a market place that required tighter management of 
operating cashflow.     
This section aims to consider what elements of a firm interact with the 
environment in such a way that the result is the differential selection of the firm’s 
replicating entities. It has been recently argued (Jones, 2005) that at present there appears 
to be an absence of focus upon what element/s of the firm is interacting with the 
environment. If the position of Hodgson (2003a) is taken, and habits and routines are 
taken as replicators, the question remains, what interacts? Aldrich (1999) states that firms 
of all sizes are characterised by the following three dimensions: goal-directed behaviours, 
boundary maintenance, and activity systems. From this perspective, why and where 
interaction occurs is accounted for respectively by the firm’s goals and boundaries. 
However, the activity systems of a firm cannot simply be considered as the interactor. 
Aldrich notes that activity systems are comprised of sets of routines and bundles of 
activities that facilitate the processing of raw materials, information and people. However, 
the question now arises, which activities are performed outside the firm and therefore 
interact with the environment, and which are performed inside and don’t interact with the 
environment? This task is all the more important given that Hodgson (2003a) rightly 
points out that routines cannot be both the generative structures (i.e. replicators) and the 
outcomes of such structures (i.e. interactors). It is therefore necessary to remove any 
potential confusion as to what elements of a firm interact and which elements replicate. 
Adapting Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgy approach, we can establish interaction 
boundaries using his frontstage, backstage metaphor. The frontstage represents the space 
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where the firm’s performance interacts with the environment, whereas the backstage 
represents the space where this performance is rehearsed, planed, designed and 
implemented. The use of the metaphor encourages exploration of the suggested 
relationship between the interacting elements and the environment. The challenge remains 
to separate front stage from back stage, and to define what was visibly offered for 
consumption by the firm. Just as important is to establish which backstage processes 
(despite their invisibility) determined the nature of the performance.  
If this challenge is resolved, then we can move beyond assuming the firm’s entire 
activity system interacts with its operating environment. We can see the proposition that 
the market selects and removes firms that have insufficient profits (Murmann, 2003), 
while true, is an after the event description of what has been selected. Given that markets 
are “in fact quite tolerant of underperformance” (Whittington, 1993: 24), going beyond a 
default to profits is necessary. It is more likely that specific elements of the firm’s 
performance (rejected on the front stage) have caused insufficient profits. Therefore, a 
focus on interacting entities must move beyond activity systems, but not extend 
immediately to entire firms. What must be considered is the actual nature of what is 
offered for consumption. It has been proposed (Jones, 2005) that what constitutes the 
firm’s offerings could be considered, a combination of activities that are delivered by 
humans and technologies, actual products and services, and the projected identity of the 
firm. These three elements, while not representing an exhaustive search for all possible 
offerings provide elements of focus. Through them, we can see how change is enacted 
within the firm through modification to existing goals, boundaries and activities, and we 
have material elements whose consumption (i.e. marketplace acceptance) can be 
measured. The firm’s three interacting elements are now briefly considered in more detail.  
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While a combination of activities that are delivered by humans and technologies 
seems broad in description, we can be more specific. This first element relates to all 
contact points through which the firm and its agents interact with all external stakeholder 
groups. The actual services and products the firm provides should require no further 
explanation as an element through which firm/stakeholder interaction occurs. The last 
proposed element is that of identity. Identity has previously been considered an interactor 
(Knudsen, 2002: 461) with regards to “the personal and professional identity of team 
members”. However, the proposed role of identity considered here is at the higher level of 
the firm itself. The literature tends to use the phase ‘corporate identity’ (Stuart, 1997) to 
describe corporate personality, which is based upon corporate strategy. Here, the term 
‘corporate’ will be used interchangeably with ‘firm’ to reflect the broad application of the 
evolutionary ideas expressed. Therefore, the identity of a firm embodies its culture and 
personality and a function of its interaction with external stakeholders is the firm’s image. 
It is this image that influences the firm’s fitness within its operating environment.    
In going beyond profit as a factor directly selected for or against, other possible 
elements have been considered through which interaction with the environment may be 
better understood. This approach facilitates the separation of the processes that relate to 
interaction and replication. As will be discussed, a failure to do so would prevent the 
isolation of the specific processes that constitute a generative mechanism (i.e. mechanism 
of transmission), potentially subject to change through internal modification. 
The major task according to Durham (1991: 24) is to identify what “governs the 
transmission of units [i.e. habits and routines] through space and time and either maintains 
or erodes variability”. That is, how can we explain the operation of entities that influence 
(and are differentially selected as a result of) the interacting elements of a firm? How can 
we account for the retention of current practices or the emergence of new practices, either 
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of which may maintain, increase, or decrease overall fitness? Essentially what is being 
considered is an explanation of how the evolutionary process of variation, selection and 
retention occurs within the firm. Or, what learning capacity does a firm have (or not have), 
which in turn influence the composition of its interacting elements?  
Campbell (1965: 27) states that if all components of the variation-selection-
retention process are present, “a socio-cultural learning process is inevitable”. Learning is 
described within an organizational setting as, outcomes related to change via analysis or 
imitation, or, a process of adaptation dependent upon delicately balancing exploration 
against exploitation (March, 1991). This suggests that to achieve learning dependent 
outcomes, both variation and retention processes must relate to each, despite the inherent 
forces that alienate each from the other. The ability of firms to select new variations (or 
retain existing variations) clearly shapes the nature of their interacting elements. However, 
to use an adaptation of Aristotle’s approach to the use of anger, any firm can change – that 
is easy. But to change the right activity systems, to the right degree, at the right time, for 
the right purpose, and in the right way – that is not easy. To further explore this issue, we 
need to consider Knudsen’s (2002) baseline idea. 
Both sides of the selection – adaptation argument can be reconciled within 
Knudsen’s (2002: 453) baseline theory, given his assertion that the progress of knowledge 
through an adaptive process “requires a baseline through which the value of a possible 
modification can be evaluated”. Therefore, the firm’s activity systems could represent 
behaviours that produce products and services, are responsible for the development of a 
firm’s identity, and facilitate contact between the firm’s systems (be they human of 
technological) and external stakeholders. In short, they are responsible for what occurs of 
the front stage. This performance is dependent upon the potential capabilities of the firm 
to plan, revise, and implement such behaviour. At anytime, the firm is in receipt of 
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feedback from its audience. The market share achieved by products and services, the 
image present in the marketplace of the firm, and information received during contact 
between the staff and/or technological interface all represent substantial and ongoing 
feedback. This feedback should act to stimulate further planning, revision, and 
implementation of future performance. This activity is performed on the back stage and 
guided by the pressures of natural selection that are real and present on the front stage. 
This pressure should provide guidance to the adaptive intentions of the firm. The process 
of internal selection, a function of the habits and routines present within the firm, is 
ultimately judged by the audience on the front stage.  
Just how such habits and routines combine to influence the composition of 
interacting elements remains largely a mystery. A developing approach (Jones, 2005) has 
been the overlaying of an existing conceptual framework to highlight the learning 
processes that connect back stage and front stage selection pressures. This has been 
attempted through consideration of Zahra and George’s reconceptualization of the 
absorptive capacity construct. They define absorptive capacity as having two distinct 
components that together are operationalized as “a set of organizational routines and 
processes by which firms acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit knowledge to produce 
a dynamic organizational capability” (2002: 186). Within this new definition are two 
specific components, potential (i.e. acquisition and assimilation) and realized (i.e. 
transformation and exploitation) absorptive capacity. Potential absorptive capacity is the 
capability to sense what information is relevant, acquire it, analysis it, comprehend it and 
internalise it. As such, it provides the firm an appreciation of the exogenous environmental 
forces that may or may not favour the firm’s existing offerings. Realized absorptive 
capacity relates to the processes that blend existing knowledge with newly acquired 
knowledge to gain new insights to opportunities or problems and provide structured 
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pathways to develop new competencies. In aggregate, the two components potential 
provide the foundation of “a dynamic capability pertaining to knowledge creation and 
utilization” (Zahra & George, 2002: 185). When viewed from an evolutionary perspective, 
it is argued that this interpretation of the absorptive capacity construct supports discussion 
of how, why, and when individual firms learn about environmental change. The construct 
also seems to fit with Hodgson’s (2003a) habits and routines as replicators approach.  
The four dimensions of absorptive capacity; acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation, and exploitation, can be seen to be present as potential behaviours. These 
potential capabilities are triggered by external or internal events that cause to the firm to 
respond to the stimuli. That is, the firm’s ability to efficiently acquire and assimilate 
external knowledge is a function of their past capability to perform such behaviours under 
the same context and selective pressures. However, this learning potential only influences 
the firm’s evolutionary potential (Jones, 2003) if all four dimensions coexist as a cohesive 
whole. Merely increasing awareness of variations does not endow the firm with the ability 
to maintain or increase the fitness of the interacting elements. Thus, the firm is subject to 
selection at two specific levels. First, the interacting elements face the pressures of natural 
selection, and secondly, this interaction results in the differential selection of the 
habits/routines that support the replicating processes within the firm. Given that firm’s can 
acquire new characteristics from the marketplace, the firm’s degree of potential absorptive 
capacity shapes up as critical to the process of adapting to market shocks and exploiting 
opportunities. Importantly, this capability is mediated by the degree of prior knowledge 
held across specific domains. 
The four issues discussed thus far can be now brought together and their 
interrelatedness considered in more detail. In doing so the challenges that confront the 
development of a sound evolutionary approach to the study of entrepreneurship are again 
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highlighted. This discussion can be assisted with reference to Figure 3, Replicating and 
Interacting Entities (over the page).  
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Within Figure 3, all the minimal elements of an evolutionary theory (as presented 
in Figure 2) are allowed for. A process of external selection is present that acts directly 
upon the firm’s interacting elements. Such interaction creates the opportunity for feedback 
to be received via a baseline from which comparisons are made to existing perceptions of 
the firm and its marketplace. So, a means of (both internal and external) selection is 
present, sources of variation are accounted for through internal adjustments related to 
knowledge of and feedback form the marketplace, and retention is clearly possible through 
the maintenance of the firm’s interacting elements. Individual habits that collectively form 
organizational routines responsible for the back stage learning processes that determine 
via the firm’s activity system what are produced on the front stage are accounted for. 
Taken together, the habits and routines represent a generative mechanism responsible for 
the process of replication. As has been explain previously, the interactors are suggested to 
comprise the human and technological elements that provide contact points to the firm’s 
stakeholders, the products and services on offer and the identity developed by the firm. 
The critical issue of what constitutes a mechanism of transmission has been addressed 
through discussion of a recurring learning process through which a firm can acquire, 
assimilate, transform and exploit knowledge that can increase its overall degree of fitness. 
Figure 3 does not attempt to suggest a new theory of evolution.  It merely attempts 
to bring together all the vital elements of an evolutionary theory into one model to provide 
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a focus on the middle ground. It moves away from an assumption that the either the 
environment or the adaptive abilities of a firm provide a starting point for discussion of 
entrepreneurial behavior. It suggests that any such future discussion should be centred 
between those two viewpoints. As such, any conclusion regarding the outcomes of 
entrepreneurial behavior must be derived from proper consideration of the context and 
process of such behavior. The proposed model is therefore consistent with Aldrich and 
Martinez (2001) and satisfies the minimal requirements of any future evolutionary theory. 
The use of the construct absorptive capacity provides an example of how existing theory 
can be reconciled within an evolutionary approach, an essential feature of any future 
“evolutional model of organizational change” (Aldrich, 1999: 42). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Essentially, what has been discussed is a Darwinian framework that does not 
discriminate against other forms of evolutionary thought. A dovetailing of Darwinism and 
Lamarckism is not only consistent with Darwin’s 6th edition of The Origin of Species; it is 
also supported in the current literature (Hodgson, 2001) on the proviso that Darwinism 
provides the overall framework. It has being argued that much trouble can be avoided by 
those pragmatic evolutionary theorists who tackle the real (and unresolved) issues that 
prevent the development of a sound evolutionary theory of entrepreneurship. It is 
suggested that the interactor – replicator framework developed by Hull (1988), provides a 
simple way of understanding the breadth and depth of a Darwinian approach.  
Baum and Singh (1994) in using Hull’s framework, highlight three areas of 
consideration for the development of an evolutionary theory. They see organizational 
evolution as a process dependent upon various entities (e.g. habits, routines, firms, 
populations, and communities) that replicate and interact whilst a range of processes (e.g. 
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copying, new enterprise, learning, and natural selection) occur during the specific events 
(e.g. start-up, transformation, and failure) in their life course. Their work is thought 
provoking and provides a pivotal stepping-stone worth revisiting. Figure 3 seeks to build 
upon such work by promoting a conceptual framework through which two kinds of 
processes (i.e. interaction and replication) can be seen to be connected to an entities desire 
to retain its form whilst always being capable of altering its form based on the ongoing 
feedback produced from ever occurring interaction. If it is reasonable to consider 
entrepreneurship as a function of the interaction occurring between human nature and the 
environment, then it is argued that Figure 3 provides a lens to observe the process of 
entrepreneurship. 
The development of Figure 3 also serves to highlight the many questions that 
remain unanswered regarding an evolutionary theory of entrepreneurship. For instance, at 
what point are acquired characteristics inherited, and therefore representative of a 
Lamarckian process? To what extent is the nature and type of selection forces operating 
against the firm’s interacting elements clearly understood? Which specific elements of a 
firm interact with the operating environment in such a way that they cause the differential 
selection of a firm’s replicating entities? And lastly, what learning processes are 
observable that can be reconciled to the generic evolutionary process of variation, 
selection and retention? Within all these questions, an individual or team of individuals is 
assumed to be responsible for entrepreneurial behaviors, not firms. This position 
represents an acknowledgement that the majority of firms in the world are small firms 
with principals who have much responsibility regarding the process and ability to change 
direction. Tackling these questions and the many others that require attention (Aldrich, 
1999) is but one step towards the development of a sound and legitimate evolutionary 
theory of entrepreneurship. 
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One last concluding comment is that the literature sources used throughout this 
discussion represent an extreme synthesis of eclectic work. If this paper makes only the 
contribution of drawing attention to the need to consult beyond the comfortable 
boundaries of organizational theory, it will have made a valuable contribution. Contained 
within the above discussion are the thoughts of zoologists, sociologists, anthropologists, 
palaeontologists, philosophers, geneticists, and heterodox economists. Much care is 
required to bring together such seemingly disparate contributions and maintain contextual 
similarity. This may well be just one of the necessary challenges for those researchers who 
pursue the development of an evolutionary theory of entrepreneurship.   
 
1 Hodgson (2003a) notes the application to of Darwinian ideas outside the realm of biology had long been 
promoted by many prominent individuals, including Bagehot (1872), James (1880), Ritchie (1896), Peirce 
(1898), Veblen (1899, 1919), and Baldwin (1909).  
 
2 See Hodgson (2003a; 2001) regarding the respective merits of memes, ideas, habits, and routines as 
replicating entities. 
 
3 English engineer, Fleeming Jenkin demonstrated that Darwin’s blending theory would not allow 
favourably selected biological traits to be inherited. Darwin’s 6th edition of The Origins of Species 
resurrected Lamarck’s theory of acquired characteristics (Koestler, 1978, p 180), only for it to be again 
ignored by his followers. 
 
4 The advent of the Second World War saw negative attitudes associated to Spencer’s social Darwinism 
incorrectly transferred to many Darwinian ideas and concepts. 
 
5 Hodgson (2001) and Knudsen (2001) maintain that the underlying casual structure of Lamarckian 
evolution is actually Darwinian in nature. 
 
6 The term ‘acquired characters’ is used in conjunction with Hull’s (2001) insistence that within such a 
context they are only potentially inheritable in a metaphoric sense.  
 
7 It is recognised that Baldwin, Morgan and Osborn all simultaneously and independently presented ideas 
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